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October 7, 2026 12 min read

Kill Chain, Diamond Model, ATT&CK: Three Maps of the Same Attack, and When to Use Each

Chris Rees

Chris Rees

25+ years in IT · Pluralsight author, 4.6/5 across 2,000+ ratings

Kill Chain, Diamond Model, ATT&CK: Three Maps of the Same Attack, and When to Use Each
Skillthropicwww.skillthropic.com

An intrusion is one sequence of events. CySA+ objective 3.1 gives you three different ways to describe it, and the exam's trick is that each framework is the right answer to a different question. Ask "where can we stop this" and you want the Kill Chain. Ask "what exactly did they do, in a language another team will understand" and you want ATT&CK. Ask "who is behind this and what else have they touched" and you want the Diamond Model. Here are all three drawn over the same attack.

Why three frameworks, and not one

Each framework was built by people with a different job. Lockheed Martin's analysts wanted a way to show that a targeted intrusion has stages and that stopping any one stage stops the intrusion. MITRE wanted a shared catalog of what adversaries actually do, specific enough that a detection engineer and a threat intelligence analyst could mean the same thing by the same name. The Diamond Model's authors wanted a way to reason about the adversary as an entity that persists across incidents, with infrastructure and capabilities that can be tracked.

Those are three different questions, and the exam expects you to route a scenario to the framework that answers it.

The Cyber Kill Chain: seven phases and one idea

The Cyber Kill Chain describes a targeted intrusion as seven sequential phases. Its power is the sequence: because each phase depends on the one before, a defender who breaks any link stops the chain.

  1. Reconnaissance: the attacker researches the target, from job postings to exposed services.
  2. Weaponization: they build the payload, typically pairing an exploit with a backdoor inside a deliverable file.
  3. Delivery: the payload reaches the target, by email, web, USB or a compromised site.
  4. Exploitation: the vulnerability is triggered and code runs.
  5. Installation: the attacker establishes persistence so access survives a reboot.
  6. Command and control: the implant calls home and takes instructions.
  7. Actions on objectives: the actual goal, whether exfiltration, encryption or sabotage.

The exam tests two things beyond the order. First, which phase a piece of evidence belongs to: a phishing email is delivery, a new scheduled task is installation, beaconing to an unknown domain is command and control. Second, which control breaks which link: awareness training and email filtering at delivery, patching at exploitation, application allow-listing at installation, egress filtering and DNS monitoring at command and control. Breaking the chain is the defensive lesson, and the earlier the break, the less damage.

Its known weakness, which the exam also knows, is that it assumes an attacker coming from outside, in order. Insider threats and attacks that skip phases (a stolen credential needs no exploitation) fit it badly, which is part of why ATT&CK exists.

MITRE ATT&CK: a shared vocabulary of behavior

Explore it live: every tactic and technique in this section is clickable in our free interactive ATT&CK matrix, with three worked attack stories that walk the framework left to right.

ATT&CK is a catalog, not a sequence. It organizes adversary behavior into tactics, which are the goals (initial access, persistence, privilege escalation, defense evasion, credential access, discovery, lateral movement, collection, command and control, exfiltration, impact, and a few more), and techniques, which are the specific ways of achieving them. Each technique has an ID, and many have sub-techniques.

The distinction the exam draws is tactic versus technique. A tactic is why: the attacker wants persistence. A technique is how: a scheduled task, a registry run key, a new service. When a stem describes what the attacker did and asks for the tactic, look for the goal. When it asks for the technique, look for the method.

The IDs are what make ATT&CK useful in practice. Two analysts in different organizations, a threat intelligence report, a detection rule and a red team plan can all refer to the same behavior by its ID and mean exactly the same thing. That is why the outline calls out technique IDs and shared vocabulary: ATT&CK is the common language, and a heat map of which techniques your detections cover is the standard way of showing where the gaps are.

The seven Kill Chain phases in a row, aligned above the ATT&CK tactics that correspond to each stage of the same intrusion, showing that ATT&CK expands the later phases into many distinct tactics ONE INTRUSION, TWO MAPS Kill Chain Recon Weaponize Deliver Exploit Install C2 Objectives ATT&CK tactics Reconnaissance Resource dev. Initial access Execution Persistence C2 Exfiltration, impact plus escalation, evasion, credentials, discovery, lateral movement The Kill Chain compresses everything after installation into two boxes. ATT&CK expands that stretch into the tactics where most of a modern intrusion, and most of your detection opportunity, actually lives. The Kill Chain is linear and answers "where do we break it." ATT&CK is a catalog and answers "what did they do, in a name we all share." Neither says who the adversary is. That is the Diamond Model's job.
Aligned on one intrusion, the two maps agree on the beginning and diverge on the middle, which is exactly where ATT&CK earns its place.

The Diamond Model: reasoning about the adversary

The Diamond Model describes any intrusion event with four vertices: an adversary uses a capability (the malware, the exploit, the technique) over infrastructure (the domains, IP addresses and accounts that deliver and control it) against a victim. The edges between them are where the analysis happens.

The Diamond Model as four vertices, adversary at top, victim at bottom, infrastructure at left and capability at right, connected by edges, with pivot arrows showing that discovering one vertex leads to the others FOUR VERTICES, AND THE PIVOTS BETWEEN THEM Adversary who, and why Infrastructure domains, IPs, accounts Capability malware, exploits, tooling Victim who was hit, and what adversary picks a capability delivered over infrastructure Pivot: a C2 domain leads to other victims that contacted it, to other malware that used it, and eventually to the adversary.
Every event has all four vertices whether or not you know them yet. The analyst's work is to fill in the missing ones by pivoting from what is known.

Pivoting is the skill the exam names. Start from the vertex you have. You know the victim and you found a command and control domain: that is infrastructure. Search the estate for other systems that contacted it, and you have more victims. Search threat intelligence for other malware that used it, and you have capabilities. Cluster enough capabilities and infrastructure together over time and you have an adversary, with a pattern you can recognize the next time it appears. The model also carries meta-features such as timestamp, phase (which links it to the Kill Chain) and result, which is how an event becomes an activity thread.

One intrusion, walked through all three

Take a common scenario: a finance employee opens an invoice attachment, a macro runs, a scheduled task appears, the host begins beaconing to a domain registered last week, and three days later a file share is encrypted.

On the Kill Chain, the attachment is delivery, the macro is exploitation, the scheduled task is installation, the beacon is command and control, and the encryption is actions on objectives. The defensive question is where the cheapest break was: email filtering or macro blocking at delivery and exploitation would have ended it before installation.

In ATT&CK, the same events become techniques with IDs: spear-phishing attachment under initial access, user execution and a scripting interpreter under execution, scheduled task under persistence, an application-layer protocol under command and control, data encrypted for impact under impact. That list is what the detection engineer needs, because each technique maps to specific telemetry, and it is what the report to a partner organization should contain, because they can search for the same IDs.

In the Diamond Model, the finance employee's host is the victim, the macro and the encryptor are the capability, the domain and the mail sender are infrastructure, and the adversary is unknown until you pivot. Search the estate for anything else that contacted the domain and you find two more victims. Search intelligence for the domain's registrar and hosting pattern and you find infrastructure linked to a known group. The adversary vertex fills in, and the next campaign from the same group is recognizable on day one.

Same events, three products: a place to break it, a list to detect it, and a picture of who did it.

Which map, for which question

The scenario asks... Framework Why
where a control could have stopped this Kill Chain it is built on breaking a phase
what phase a piece of evidence belongs to Kill Chain phases are its vocabulary
how to describe what was done so another team can act on it ATT&CK technique IDs are the shared language
where detection coverage has gaps ATT&CK the heat map of techniques versus detections
whether the attacker's goal was persistence or escalation ATT&CK tactics are goals
who is behind this and what else they have touched Diamond Model it models the adversary and supports pivoting
how a new domain connects to a past incident Diamond Model infrastructure is a vertex you pivot from

The frameworks are not rivals, and mature teams use all three: the Kill Chain to explain to leadership where the defense failed, ATT&CK to write the detections and the report, the Diamond Model to build the intelligence picture that makes the next intrusion recognizable. The exam's scenarios pick one question at a time; your job is to notice which.

Key takeaways

  • Kill Chain: seven phases in order, and breaking any one stops the intrusion. Evidence maps to a phase; controls map to the phase they break. Weak on insiders and skipped phases.
  • ATT&CK: tactics are goals, techniques are methods, IDs are the shared vocabulary. Heat maps show detection gaps.
  • Diamond Model: adversary, capability, infrastructure, victim. Pivot from the vertex you know to discover the ones you do not.
  • Route the scenario by its question: where to stop it, what was done, or who did it.
  • They compose. Phase links the Diamond Model to the Kill Chain; ATT&CK names the capability.

Attack frameworks are objective 3.1 of CySA+ Domain 3, Incident Response and Management, 24% of the exam, and they give the incident response process its vocabulary. The AI-specific counterpart, MITRE ATLAS, borrows ATT&CK's structure for attacks on models. Work all 20 topics with our CySA+ Domain 3 study guide.

#CySA #CS0004 #IncidentResponse #CyberKillChain #MITREATTACK #DiamondModel #ThreatIntelligence #BlueTeam #CompTIA #CyberSecurity

CySA+ Domain 3 · 24% of the exam

Know the attack before you answer it

Incident Response and Management is a quarter of CySA+ CS0-004. Work all 20 topics across three objectives, from the Kill Chain, Diamond Model and ATT&CK through the response process and the techniques of containment, eradication and recovery, with 60 practice questions.

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