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November 10, 2026 13 min read

DAC, MAC, RBAC, ABAC: How the CISSP Picks an Access Control Model, and the PDP/PEP Machinery That Runs It

Chris Rees

Chris Rees

25+ years in IT · Pluralsight author, 4.6/5 across 2,000+ ratings

DAC, MAC, RBAC, ABAC: How the CISSP Picks an Access Control Model, and the PDP/PEP Machinery That Runs It
Skillthropicwww.skillthropic.com

An auditor asks the exam's model organization a simple question: who can approve a customs declaration over one million euros? The application has 214 permission combinations across 1,400 users, assigned one at a time over nine years, and the answer takes a two-day database query nobody can validate. That is what choosing an authorization model decides: how that question gets answered. Objective 5.4 gives you six models, and the exam tests them by describing how a decision is made and asking you to name the model that makes it that way.

The question each model answers

Every access control model is an answer to three questions: who decides, on what basis, and how expressive the decision can be. Authentication, covered in the Kerberos and RADIUS post, establishes who the subject is. Authorization decides what that subject may do to which object, and the model is the rule for making that decision. The exam's stems almost never name the model; they describe the decision, and the discriminators are the ones in the grid below: an owner granting access is DAC, a label being compared to a clearance is MAC, a job function is RBAC, a global condition is rule-based, a combination of properties is ABAC, and a computed score is risk-based.

DAC: the owner decides

In discretionary access control the object's owner grants access at their discretion, typically through an access control list attached to the object. It is the model of file systems and collaboration tools, and it is flexible precisely because every owner grants independently. That independence is also its weakness: permissions sprawl, nobody can answer the auditor's question, and a Trojan horse running with a user's rights can grant away anything that user owns. The word "owner" in a stem, or a user sharing their own file, points to DAC.

MAC: the system decides from labels

In mandatory access control the system enforces access by comparing the subject's clearance to the object's label, and no user can override it, not even for an object they created. Labels form a lattice: levels such as unclassified through top secret, combined with compartments that implement need to know, so a top secret clearance still does not reach a compartment the subject was not read into. This is the model of government classification and of SELinux-style enforcement, and it is the model the Bell-LaPadula and Biba rules were written to describe. Rigid by design, heavy to administer, and the right answer only when classification is mandated and the cost of a wrong grant is unacceptable.

RBAC: the role decides

In role-based access control, permissions attach to roles and users are assigned roles. It is the commercial default because it scales administration and makes entitlements reviewable: you audit a role once rather than a thousand users. The exam expects the discipline that makes it work.

Element Requirement
Role definition derived from job function, never by copying what an individual currently has, which imports every existing excess
Role granularity too few roles forces over-granting; too many recreates per-user administration through role explosion
Role hierarchy senior roles inherit junior permissions, so inheritance is explicit rather than duplicated
Static separation of duties conflicting roles cannot both be assigned to one user; enforced at assignment
Dynamic separation of duties conflicting roles may both be held but not activated in the same session or transaction
Role ownership every role has a business owner who periodically confirms its contents

Static and dynamic separation of duties are a favorite pair. Static means the person who creates vendors can never also hold the role that approves payments. Dynamic means they may hold both, but cannot use both in the same transaction. A stem about a user who was legitimately assigned two roles but is blocked from exercising them together is dynamic.

A grid of the six access control models down the side, discretionary, mandatory, role-based, rule-based, attribute-based and risk-based, against four decision properties across the top, who decides, what the decision is based on, how fine the granularity is and how well it scales, with one short answer in each cell SIX MODELS, FOUR QUESTIONS Who decides What decides Granularity Scalability DAC the object's owner an ACL on the object per object, per user sprawls; hard to audit MAC the system, from policy label against clearance per level and compartment rigid; scales by label RBAC administrators, via roles the user's job function per role audit roles, not users Rule-based the system, globally a rule, whoever you are per rule simple; layered on others ABAC policy, at the PDP subject, object, action, context per attribute combination expressive; hard to govern Risk-based policy plus a risk score device, location, behavior per request, adaptive conditional access at scale Read a stem for the "what decides" column first. It separates the six models faster than any other question.
The second column is the exam's discriminator. An owner, a label, a role, a rule, a set of attributes or a score: name what the decision is based on and the model names itself.

Rule-based, ABAC and risk-based: context decides

Rule-based access control applies global rules to every subject regardless of identity: a firewall ruleset, a time-of-day restriction, a source-network condition. It is usually layered on another model rather than standing alone, and the tell in a stem is a condition that applies to everyone.

Attribute-based access control evaluates attributes of the subject, the object, the action and the environment against a policy: a broker may view a declaration if their organization is the declarant, the declaration is not archived, and the request comes from a managed device. It is the most expressive model and the hardest to govern, because a policy that can say anything is a policy nobody can fully review. The exam's most common confusion is RBAC against ABAC. RBAC asks what role the user holds and grants that role's fixed permissions. ABAC asks whether the properties of this subject, this object, this action and this moment satisfy the policy. If the decision depends on properties of the specific object or the current context, it is ABAC; if it depends only on the user's job function, it is RBAC.

Risk-based or adaptive access adds a computed score from signals such as device posture, location, behavior, time and resource sensitivity, and can permit, deny or demand step-up authentication. It is the model behind conditional access and Zero Trust, and it is the answer when a stem describes a decision that changes with circumstances a static rule could not anticipate.

The attribute-based access control request flow: a subject sends a request that the policy enforcement point intercepts, the enforcement point asks the policy decision point for a decision, the decision point pulls attributes from the policy information point and policy from the policy administration point, returns permit or deny to the enforcement point, and only a permitted request is passed through to the resource ONE REQUEST THROUGH THE POLICY ARCHITECTURE PAP authors and versions policy policy subject user, device, session 1 PEP intercepts, then enforces 2 4 PDP evaluates: permit or deny 3 PIP directory, posture, classification resource owner, classification 5 1: request. 2: decision request. 3: attributes fetched. 4: permit or deny. 5: only a permitted request reaches the resource.
The enforcement point sits with the resource and never decides; the decision point is central and never enforces. That split is what lets one policy govern a thousand resources, and it is the machinery Zero Trust runs on.

The architecture has four named parts, and the exam tests the split between the first two. The policy enforcement point intercepts the request where the resource is served and enforces whatever answer comes back. The policy decision point evaluates the policy against the supplied attributes and returns permit or deny. The policy information point supplies the attributes: directory data, device posture, data classification, a risk score. The policy administration point is where policy is authored and versioned. XACML is the standard language and request-response model for this architecture. A distributed PEP with a central PDP is exactly what makes Zero Trust implementable, and a stem that asks which component "intercepts" wants the PEP, while one that asks which component "evaluates" wants the PDP.

Matrix, ACLs and capability tables

The access control matrix is the conceptual table of subjects against objects, with each cell holding the rights. Nobody stores the whole table; systems store it by column or by row. Read a column and you have an access control list: attached to the object, listing who may do what to it, which is how file systems work. Read a row and you have a capability list: carried by the subject, listing what it may do to which objects, which is how tokens and tickets work. The discriminator is whether the list is attached to the object or carried by the subject. A Kerberos ticket is a capability; a folder's permissions are an ACL.

Exam tip: every model needs a stated default, and it must be deny: the implicit deny at the end of a firewall ruleset, the absence of a matching grant in an ACL. Two things break it in practice, and both appear in stems: an overly broad allow earlier in the evaluation order that matches before the specific deny, and a "temporary" exception at the top of a ruleset that outlived its reason.

Picking the model in a scenario

The exam's selection questions describe an organization and ask which model fits. The answer follows from what the organization needs the decision to depend on.

Scenario Model Why
Military or intelligence system with classified data MAC classification is mandated, users must not be able to share below their level, and the cost of a wrong grant is unacceptable
Hospital with clinicians, nurses, billing and researchers RBAC with an ABAC layer job function decides most access; record-level scoping (this patient, this ward, under treatment) needs attributes
Startup with twenty people and shared documents DAC ownership is meaningful, flexibility matters more than auditability, and the administration of MAC or ABAC is unaffordable
Cloud API serving many tenants ABAC the decision depends on the tenant, the resource's tags, the action and the calling context, none of which a static role captures
Any of the above, accessed remotely risk-based on top device posture, location and behavior change per request, and step-up authentication answers the change

The model organization from the opening rebuilt its customs application on RBAC with an ABAC layer for record-level scoping, and the auditor's question became a two-line policy anyone could read. That combination, roles for the coarse grant and attributes for the fine one, is the pattern the exam expects for most modern enterprises, with MAC reserved for mandated classification and DAC for the small and informal.

Four stems, decoded

  1. A user creates a document and finds she cannot share it with a colleague whose clearance is lower. MAC. The system enforces the label, and ownership confers no right to override it.
  2. A finance clerk holds both the vendor-creation and payment-approval roles but the system refuses to let him use both within one transaction. Dynamic separation of duties in RBAC. Static would have prevented the assignment.
  3. A broker can view a declaration only if her firm is the declarant, the record is not archived, and she is on a managed device. ABAC. The decision depends on object and environment attributes, not on a role.
  4. A login from an unfamiliar country to a sensitive application triggers a request for a second factor. Risk-based access. The score changed the decision; the policy did not.

Key takeaways

  • Name what the decision is based on and the model names itself. Owner: DAC. Label against clearance: MAC. Job function: RBAC. Global condition: rule-based. Attributes: ABAC. Score: risk-based.
  • RBAC asks what role you hold; ABAC asks whether this subject, object, action and context satisfy the policy. Object or context in the decision means ABAC.
  • Static separation of duties blocks the assignment; dynamic blocks the activation. Roles come from job functions, never from copying an individual's access.
  • The PEP intercepts and enforces; the PDP evaluates; the PIP supplies attributes; the PAP manages policy. Distributed PEPs with a central PDP are how Zero Trust runs.
  • ACLs are the matrix by column, on the object; capabilities are the matrix by row, carried by the subject. Default deny, and watch the broad allow that matches first.

Authorization mechanisms are objective 5.4 of CISSP Domain 5, Identity and Access Management, 13% of the exam, and the bridge between the authentication systems of 5.6 and the IAM fundamentals every later domain assumes. Work all six Domain 5 objectives with our free CISSP Domain 5 study guide.

#CISSP #ISC2 #AccessControl #RBAC #ABAC #MandatoryAccessControl #ZeroTrust #IAM #InfoSec #CyberSecurity

CISSP Domain 5 · identity and access management

Go past the acronyms

Authentication systems and authorization mechanisms are two of six objectives in CISSP Domain 5, 13% of the exam. Work all 26 topics, from controlling access to assets through federation, the provisioning lifecycle and Kerberos, RADIUS and TACACS+, with 60 practice questions.

  1. Find your gapsA free readiness quiz scores you domain by domain.
  2. Study what's on the testWork through every objective, with practice questions.
  3. Book it with confidenceSchedule the exam when you're scoring well in every domain.

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